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JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN*
Historically, local governments have remained relatively free
from direct federal influence. In fact, the federal constitution man-
dates that electoral systems, voter qualifications, and government
structurebe determined primarily at the state or local level., The
federal government, however, increasingly has intruded into the
prerogatives of state governments as part of an intensified effort to
end racial discrimination. 2 Under the aegis of the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments and their implementing statutes, the federal
government has precipitated fundamental changes in some local
government systems.3 Local governments subject to Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965,1 the most significant statute implement-
ing the fifteenth amendment, may make virtually no changes in
their electoral systems without the approval either of the Attorney
General or the District Court for the District of Columbia.5 These
federal authorities will not approve any changes until they are satis-
fied that the right of racial and foreign language minorities to par-
ticipate in the electoral process is safeguarded.'
* B.A., University of New Hampshire, M.A., Ph.D., Syracuse University. Professor of
Political Science, Graduate School of Public Affairs, State University of New York at Albany.
The author wishes to thank Christine M. Cashin, Kent Goldwire, and Michael E. Morandi
for the assistance they provided in conducting legal research for this Article.
1. In establishing the federal system the Constitution did not restrict the traditional powers
of the states to prescribe voter qualifications and electoral systems. The states retained these
powers under the tenth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. X. Indeed, constitutional qualifica-
tions for electors of members of the House of Representatives incorporate state standards.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
2. See notes 52-112 infra & accompanying text.
3. See note 74 infra & accompanying text.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970).
5. Id. See notes 83-91 infra & accompanying text.
6. See notes 92-112 infra & accompanying text.
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As a result of the legal standards formulated to preserve the vot-
ing rights of these minorities, a trend toward federal imposition of
the single-member district, or ward, electoral system is discernable.7
These systems are replacing at-large voting systems, thus reversing
the previously widespread transformation from ward systems to at-
large systems occasioned by the municipal reform movement at the
turn of the century.8 Although many of the historical reasons for the
preference of at-large systems by the municipal reform movement'
no longer are applicable,"0 the use of the single-member district
system as a tool to promote racial equality has induced many seri-
ous social and political inequities.
A prominent example of this deleterious situation is United Jew-
ish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey (Hasidic Jews)," in which state
assembly districts in parts of New York City were reapportioned by
the state legislature to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The
evidence showed that new districts were drawn with the deliberate
purpose of creating a specified non-white racial majority in a certain
number of districts so as to ensure the election of non-white repre-
sentatives in those districts.' 2 The particular parameters used to
guide this redistricting were chosen primarily because the state
planners were made to understand that the Department of Justice
would approve no other scheme. 3 In implementing the controversial
technique of "reverse discrimination" to effectuate the new electoral
plan, the reapportionment caused a significant diminution in the
value of the votes of a cohesive religious minority, the Hasidic Jews
of Brooklyn, whose neighborhood was split between two of the new
districts." The redistricting not only deprived the Hasidic Jews of
an opportunity to select a representative but also was designed to
guarantee the futility of participation in the election process by any
7. The Supreme Court's preference for single-member district systems is implicit in many
racial discrimination cases. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975);
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp.
1021 (D.D.C. 1972), affl'd, 410 U.S. 962 (1973). This predilection is even more marked in
numerical malapportionment cases. See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975); Connor v.
Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971).
8. See text accompanying note 17 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 17-18 infra.
10. See note 21 infra.
11. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
12. Id. at 152.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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voter whose interests conflicted with those of the non-white majority
in the particular district. The United States Supreme Court sanc-
tioned this result as permissible under the Voting Rights Act, hold-
ing implicitly that the Act mandated actions necessary to protect
racial minorities, even if those safeguards imposed harsh social bur-
dens on non-racial minorities. 5
The single-member district plan in Hasidic Jews was validated in
large part because the Supreme Court viewed the Voting Rights Act
as a remedial measure. When the methods selected to implement
this remedial measure ultimately produce undesirable effects, how-
ever, a search for less severe alternatives becomes appropriate. At-
tempts to devise a "fair" and "equal" system of representation have
been made since the origin of representative government, leading to
a variety of systems designed to reflect the will of the electorate.
This Article briefly examines several potential local electoral sys-
tems with respect to both'their ability to eliminate racial represen-
tation problems and their propensity for inducing or ameliorating
other undesirable socio-political conditions. Upon comparison of
these options, a scheme known as Proportional Representation
(PR), which is a permissible electoral system under the Voting
Rights Act, will be proposed as a meritorious alternative to the
single-member district system. The Article concludes that, except
where forbidden by state constitutional provisions, 8 local govern-
ments with minority group representation problems should consider
carefully the possibility of adopting PR rather than single-member
district electoral systems.
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND LOCAL ELECTORAL SYsTEMs
Historical Background
During the nineteenth century many municipalities patterned
their government structures after those existing at the national and
state levels and adopted bicameral councils elected under the ward
system. Near the turn of the century, however, a movement for the
reformation of city governments gathered momentum as the prob-
lems created by political machines and the increasing complexities
of municipal life proved difficult to correct under the existing ward
15. Id. at 155.
16. See notes 144-57 infra & accompanying text.
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systems. The "municipal reform movement" of the early twentieth
century strongly attacked the ward system, identifying several
major deficiencies. The ward system confined each voter's influence
to his particular election district, and ward representatives natu-
rally attempted to win favor with their electorate by persuading the
city council to grant benefits to their wards, regardless of the ulti-
mate effect of the council's actions on the city as a whole. Because
each voter's interest primarily extended to that portion of the politi-
cal process with which he had some influence, the politics of any
given ward generally interested only its residents. Thus, self-serving
political cliques developed in relative obscurity within wards, free
from close scrutiny by the press or the public. Another major prob-
lem aggravated by the ward system was inequality in representa-
tion. As a consequence of either deliberate gerrymandering or grad-
ual population shifts, ward boundaries often favored a particular
faction of the population. These factions frequently acquired a dis-
proportionate control of the city council and were able to resist
redistricting for long periods. The demise of the ward system in
many municipalities has been attributed primarily to these fac-
tors.
17
Three major goals of the municipal reform movement were the
elimination of municipal corruption, the achievement of increased
efficiency and economy in the provision of municipal services, and
the attainment of improved representation in municipal govern-
ment. Convinced that a positive correlation existed between the
electoral system and the responsiveness of the governing body to its
citizens, the movement's participants sought changes in the elec-
toral system and the size of the city council. The reformers advo-
cated the replacement of partisan elections, the ward system, and
a large bicameral city council with a small unicameral council
elected at-large by non-partisan ballots.
An at-large electoral system presumably would correct several of
the deficiencies perceived in the ward system. Thus, council mem-
bers would be encouraged to perceive problems in terms of their
impact on the city as a whole. Moreover, neither deliberate nor
inadvertant inequities in numerical apportionment could arise be-
cause elections would be city-wide and each voter would make his
selections from an identical slate of candidates. By downgrading the
17. See generally R. CimLs, THE FIRST 50 YEARs 37 (1965).
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political cliques' influence in the election of council members, the
elimination of wards also would discourage the development of the
small-scale organizations so important to the political machines'
ability to maintain their power.
Numerous municipalities adopted the at-large system as a result
of the municipal reform movement, and many students of local
government believe the reform program improved the quality of
municipal government. Current conditions, however, have necessi-
tated that the electoral system prescribed by the reformers be reas-
sessed. A major objection to the use of at-large elections is that the
system permits the over-representation of a cohesive majority, such
as middle class, white voters, denying any direct representation to
sizable minority groups. For example, blacks in Albany, Georgia,
who constituted forty percent of the city's population, were unable
to elect a single black citizen to any elective office in that city for
over twenty-five years under an at-large system. Such dispropor-
tionate representation may create or aggravate minority group al-
ienation and feelings of political impotence, which eventually may
lead to a complete withdrawal by those citizens from participation
in the political process. In addition, under an at-large system, a
ruling white majority may maintain its overrepresented status and
may dilute the voting strength of a growing black minority by an-
nexing a predominately white area. The results of such an annexa-
tion actually could transform a black majority within the city's
original boundaries to a minority within the new city limits.'9
The problems created by at-large systems have compelled the
federal government to direct the restructuring of many local elec-
toral systems to protect the rights of racial minorities. Pursuant to
this intervention, numerous existing at-large systems have been re-
placed by racially balanced single-member district electoral
schemes,20 in a reversal of the municipal reform movement's evolu-
tion away from that system. Although many of the historical evils
associated with the ward system are unlikely to reappear in the
modem era,2' the use of the single-member district system to help
18. See 19 How. L. J. 177, 182 (1976).
19. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
20. See, e.g., Perry v. City of Opelousas, 515 F.2d 639 (Sth Cir. 1975); Turner v.
McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1973); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973)
(en banc).
21. For example, the advent of the civil service system eliminated much of the political
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eliminate racial discrimination has introduced some other signifi-
cant socio-political inequities. An illustrative example involved the
Hasidic Jews of Brooklyn.
The Hasidic Jews
Congress specifically designed the Voting Rights Act to end voting
discrimination in several southern states, but in 1970 the United
States Attorney General determined that three counties in New
York22 were subject to the Act as amended that year.? After failing
to obtain an exemption from the Act's coverage, 4 the state called a
special session of the legislature in 1974 to redistrict the pertinent
areas.25 Although the redistricting did not alter the total number of
districts with non-white majorities, it increased the majority per-
centage of non-white residents in two Senate and two Assembly
districts and decreased the non-white majority percentage in one
Senate and two Assembly districts.26
patronage, thus reducing the possibility of a political machine's emergence even if a ward
system is implemented. See generally Note, Ghetto Voting and At-Large Elections: A Subtle
Infringement on Minority Rights, 58 GEo. L. J. 989, 1003 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Ghetto
Votingi.
22. The counties were Bronx, Kings, and New York Counties.
23. The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 advanced the date to 1968 on which certain
prerequisites had to exist to subject a locality to the Act's provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b
(1970); see note 81 infra & accompanying text. One of these prerequisites, that a literacy test
exist, is satisfied by the nonavailability of ballots printed in any language except English.
Torres v. Sachs, 381 F. Supp.' 309 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 888 (1974).
24. In 1971 New York sought a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the
District of Columbia exempting the three counties from the Act's coverage. With the approval
of the Department of Justice, the court granted the judgment. The district court had denied
a motion to intervene made by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP), which appealed this ruling, without success, to the Supreme Court.
NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345 (1973). On remand, however, the NAACP's motion was
granted and, after reopening the declaratory judgment, the NAACP obtained an order from
the district court holding that the Voting Rights Act as amended applied to the congressional
and legislative districts in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the Bronx. The Supreme Court af-
firmed this decision, dismissing New York's arguments that the Bureau of the Census popula-
tion data, used by the Attorney General in his determination that the Act applied to these
subdivisions, included 250,000 aliens of voting age who were ineligible to vote and that more
than 50% of the electorate had voted. See New York v. United States, 419 U.S. 888 (1974).
25. Although New York had redistricted in 1972, the Attorney General rejected that plan,
which constituted a change to an electoral system requiring approval under the Voting Rights
Act. Rather than seeking a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of
Columbia validating the 1972 plan, the state attempted to satisfy the Justice Department's
objections by making a new plan. See United Jewish Organs., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144,
150-51 (1977).
26. Id. at 151-52.
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Objections to some of the new district lines were advanced in
federal district court by representatives of Brooklyn's Hasidic Jews,
who argued that the new Assembly districts divided the Hasidic
community, thus making it the victim of racial gerrymandering and
diluting the value of the Hasidic Jews' votes in violation of the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection and due process clauses. 27
The Hasidic community also challenged the assumption that only
black legislators could represent properly the interests of black citi-
zens. In-court testimony by Richard S. Scolaro, executive director
of the legislative committee that drew the district boundaries,
stated that the Hasidic community was split between two Assembly
districts solely because the Department of Justice insisted on a non-
white majority in those districts.2 Nevertheless, while the case was
pending, the Attorney General approved the new districts, dismiss-
ing objections made by Hasidic, Irish, Italian, and Polish groups on
the ground that the Act was designed to prevent voting discrimina-
tion only on the basis of race or color, not on the basis of ethnic
origin or religious belief.L29 The Attorney General stressed that his
function under the Voting Rights Act was not to dictate to New York
a specific redistricting plan but, rather, to determine whether the
scheme devised by the state was acceptable."'
The district court similarly dismissed the Hasidic Jews' com-
plaint, concluding that the members of the Hasidic community
were not disenfranchised and that a state validly could consider race
when redistricting to correct previous racial discrimination.3 1 Af-
firming the district court's decision, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reasoned that the redistricting did not
cause the underiepresentation of whites, who comprised sixty-five
percent of the population, inasmuch as approximately seventy per-
cent of the Assembly and Senate districts in Kings County would
contain white majorities.3 2 The court of appeals was convinced that
a legislature would confront an impossible task if "a state must in
27. Id. at 152-53.
28. Greenhouse, Hasidic Jews are Called "Victims of a Racial Gerrymander" at Hearing
on Suit, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1974, at 19, col. 2.
29. See also Tochin, U.S. Accepts Plan on Districts Here, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1974, at 24,
col. 3.
30. See United Jewish Organs., Inc. v. Wilson, 430 U.S. 144, 161 n.19 (1976).
31. United Jewish Organs., Inc. v. Wilson, 377 F. Supp. 1164, 1165-66 (D.D.C. 1974).
32. United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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a reapportionment draw lines so as to preserve ethnic community
unity. ' 3
In United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey (Hasidic Jews),34
the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision by a
seven-to-one margin. Noting that neither the fourteenth nor the
fifteenth amendment mandates a per se rule against using racial
factors in districting and apportionment,35 the Court held that the
remedial nature of the Voting Rights Act permitted, and perhaps
required, the use of racial considerations in reapportionments sub-
ject to the Act.36 Moreover, according to the Court, the Hasidic
community was properly represented insofar as race was concerned
because the total proportion of districts with white majorities cor-
responded closely to the total proportion of whites in the municipal
population.37 In his partial concurrence, Justice Brennan seemed to
reflect the overall attitude of the majority when he indicated that,
although the redistricting unfortunately split the Hasidic com-
munity, that harm was outweighed by the benefit of ensuring
non-white representation.3 1
The Supreme Court's decision in Hasidic Jews is disturbing for
several major reasons. The Court strictly limited its 1960 decision
in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,3" invalidating racial gerrymandering, and
ignored the wisdom in Justice Douglas' dissent in Wright v. Rocke-
feller:40
When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the mul-
tiracial, multireligious communities that our Constitution seeks
to weld together as one become separatist; antagonisms that re-
late to race or to religious rather than to political issues are gener-
ated; communities seek not the best representative but the best
racial or religious partisan. Since that system is at war with the
democratic ideal, it should find no footing here.4'
In his well-reasoned dissent in Hasidic Jews, Chief Justice Burger
33. Id. at 521.
34. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
35. Id. at 161.
36. Id. at 156, 159-60.
37. Id. at 162.
38. Id. at 170-71 (Brennan, J., concurring).
39. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
40. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
41. Id. at 67.
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expressed concerns similar to those troubling Justice Douglas and
also noted that the Court's opinion actually could promote segrega-
tion by encouraging minorities to move into enclaves from which
they could accumulate enough votes to select a particular represent-
ative.42 The Chief Justice correctly observed that "the assumption
that 'whites' and 'non-whites' in the County form homogenous enti-
ties for voting purposes is entirely without foundation."43 Thus, the
legislators' description of Puerto Ricans as non-whites when calcu-
lating the non-white majorities in the legislative districts was made
under the erroneous assumption that blacks and Puerto Ricans in
New York City have identical interests.4
The decision in Hasidic Jews also must be criticized for condoning
the institutionalized denial of the right to vote to the entire white
minority in the sixty-five percent non-white districts. The Court's
conclusion that the white minority had not been injured because the
total percentage of districts with white majorities corresponded to
the total percentage of whites in the county4" cannot be credited. As
Justice Brennan noted, the Hasidic Jews raised a question concern-
ing their personal rights," not those of whites in general. The
Court's response to that question, that the Hasidic community had
no intrinsic right to select its own representative and that individual
votes had no constitutional complaint if their candidate failed to
win,4" is unsatisfactory. Such an argument could be applied as easily
to nonwhites who are unable to elect a particular representative
because they are dispersed among many districts." Similarly, the
Court's observations could justify a conversion from a single-
member district scheme to an at-large system in which a non-white
minority could never select their own representatives.
The most disturbing factor noted by Chief Justice Burger in his
dissent was that the Hasidic community had been "carved up" for
the sole purpose of racial gerrymandering.49 In his opinion for the
42. 430 U.S. at 186-87 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 185.
44. Puerto Rican groups claimed that the 1974 plan discriminated against them. Id.
45. Id. at 166.
46. Id. at 169 (Brennan, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 166.
48. Arguably, a minority group could have greater political influence by providing the
swing vote in many districts than it would have by possessing a clear majority in a few
districts. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964) (black petitioner and black intervenor
disagreed as to the relative effectiveness of these two approaches).
49. 430 U.S. at 186 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
1978]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Court, Justice White agreed that the purpose of creating a sixty-five
percent non-white majority was "to ensure the opportunity for the
election of a black representative." 50 The primary objective of the
percentage requirements, therefore, was to render ineffective the
white minority's participation in the election process in the event
of racial block-voting.
Although this result may be legally permissible as a remedial
measure within the scope of the Voting Rights Act, it has imposed
an extremely harsh burden on those ethnic and religious minorities
who, in effect, are denied their right to vote. The imposition of such
a system, even for the purpose of remedying past discrimination,
should be avoided if a less severe alternative is available. The most
conspicuous deficiency in the Chief Justice's dissent in Hasidic Jews
is the lack of a proposed alternative to the use of single-member
districts that would avoid "unnecessary bias for or against any ra-
cial, ethnic, or religious group,"'5' and would comply with the rele-
vant legal standards established by the Constitution and the Voting
Rights Act. Indeed, one primary objection to Hasidic Jews is the
Court's reaffirmation of the single-member district system, despite
its harmful social effects, as the electoral scheme that complies with
the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. Although the Court
failed to consider alternative electoral schemes, an independent re-
view of the various local electoral systems will establish that at least
one method, Proportional Representation (PR), provides fair repre-
sentation for all minorty groups without encouraging racial segrega-
tion or requiring harmful gerrymandering similar to that approved
in Hasidic Jews. Moreover, an analysis of the relevant federal law
will demonstrate that PR is a legally permissible electoral system
in local governments subject to the Voting Rights Act.
Federal Legal Voting Standards of Non-Discrimination
Regardless of an alternative electoral system's advantages over
the single-member district scheme, it must satisfy certain constitu-
tional requirements designed to protect against racial discrimina-
tion. In addition, some local electoral systems must comply with the
requirements established by the Voting Rights Act.
50. Id. at 162.
51. Id. at 185 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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Intentional Discrimination and Dilution
Since the adoption of the fifteenth amendment federal courts
have enjoined obvious and intentional obstacles to the free exercise
of the voting franchise by racial minorities.55 Pursuant to the au-
thority provided by that amendment, the Supreme Court has invali-
dated "grandfather clauses," 53 various procedural obstacles,54 and
literacy tests,55 and it has held that the various techniques designed
to exclude black participation in primary elections violate either the
fifteenth amendment or the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment." In addition, before the Court formally permit-
ted voters to challenge the apportionment of state legislatures in
Baker v. Carr,5 7 it invoked the fifteenth amendment, in the historic
case of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, " to invalidate an Alabama reappor-
tionment plan for Tuskegee that would have denied most of the
city's blacks their pre-existing municipal vote by removing them
from within the city's limits. Thus, the Court has made clear that
state action designed to discriminate against a racial minority in the
electoral context violates the Constitution.
A State's discriminatory intent, however, may not always be
manifest; the state might have implemented or maintained a fa-
cially neutral electoral system that was designed or had the effect
of diluting or eliminating altogether the voting strength of a racial
minority.-9 The causes of this dilution include such subtle discrimi-
natory actions as the replacement of a municipality's ward system
52. In 1875, for example, the Supreme Court invoked the fifteenth amendment to require
some recalcitrant municipal election officials to count the ballots cast by black voters. United
States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
53. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
54. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
55. See, e.g., Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp.
872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 336 U.S. 933 (1949). But see Lassiter v. Northampton
County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (literacy test upheld in absence of proof that test
was designed or could easily be used to discriminate).
56. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
57. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Baker v. Carr decided that malapportionment issues were justicia-
ble and that a voter had standing to challenge an apportionment. It was followed by the
leading case of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), from which the "one man, one vote"
doctrine evolved.
58. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
59. For a thorough discussion of this racial dilution problem, see Bonapfel, Minority Chal-
lenges to At-Large Elections: The Dilution Problem, 10 GA. L. REv. 353 (1976).
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with at-large elections, a city's annexation of a predominantly white
area, or the adoption of a redistricting plan calculated to minimize
the political influence of racial minorities. In the absence of proof
of a state's discriminatory intent, the applicable law to constitu-
tional challenges against these state actions is uncertain."0
The Supreme Court first addressed the problem of racial dilution
in the context of at-large electoral systems. Although it declined to
state that an at-large system was unconstitutional per se, the Court
initially indicated in dicta that such an electoral method could be
illegal if its effect was to minimize or cancel a racial minority's
voting strength.6 ' In 1971 the Court confronted directly the issue of
the constitutionality of an at-large electoral system in Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 12 a case involving an attack on Indiana's multimember dis-
tricting scheme for Marion County. The plaintiffs argued that the
system illegally minimized or cancelled the voting strength of the
residents of an identifiable racial ghetto enclosed by a predomi-
nantly white district. The district court had found evidence of dilu-
tion in that blacks consistently were underrepresented in proportion
to their numbers, but the Supreme Court regarded that situation as
permissible. According to the Court, no minority group has a consti-
tutional right to be represented in proportion to its voting potential;
rather, its members have only a right of effective access to the
political process.63 Not only could the ghetto blacks participate in
the electoral process on the same basis as other citizens,64 their votes
were crucial to the election of Democratic Party candidates." The
Court consequently held that the blacks' failure to achieve propor-
tionate representation was caused simply because their candidates
lost elections and not because of any intrinsic bias in the system.6
Two years after Whitcomb, the Supreme Court did hold, in White
v. Regester, 17 that the use of an at-large system resulted in an imper-
60. The Fifth Circuit has permitted the retention of historic ward boundaries drawn in
1805, before blacks were permitted to vote, on a rationale that these boundaries could not
have been made with an intent to discriminate. See Taylor v. McKeithen, 499 F.2d 893 (5th
Cir. 1974).
61. See, e.g., Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965);
Lucas v. Forty-fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1974).
62. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
63. Id. at 153-55.
64. Id. at 149-50.
65. Id. at 150-52.
66. Id. at 154-55.
67. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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missible dilution. In White the Court concluded that the mainte-
nance of multimember districts in a state legislative apportionment
plan would be illegal if "used invidiously to cancel out or minimize
the voting strength of racial groups."6 The Court indicated several
factors to be considered in determining whether a minority group's
members had been denied access to the political process: any his-
tory of racial discrimination in the district, a majority vote require-
ment for a candidate's nomination in the primary election, a rule
requiring a candidate to seek a specific position among the group of
seats available, an unreasonably low incidence of success among
racial minority candidates, and the controlling majority's lack of a
good faith interest in the needs of the minority, demonstrating that
minority votes were considered unnecessary to win elections. 9
In cases subsequent to White, if an aggregate of the factors enu-
merated by the Supreme Court were present, lower courts have held
at-large electoral schemes unconstitutional on the ground that those
systems denied minorities meaningful access to the political pro-
cess. 0 This construction of White apparently recognized a limit
below which a racial minority group's voting strength could not be
diluted. Regardless .of the cause of dilution, if the requisite factors
were established, the minority group became entitled to a beneficial
change in the electoral process. This absolute right approach to the
dilution problem thus became a racial homologue to the "one man,
one vote" doctrine previously developed by the Supreme Court in
numerical malapportionment cases.71
The viability of this broad interpretation of White, however, has
been weakened by recent decisions in which the Supreme Court has
held that proof of discrimination in violation of the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause requires a showing of subjec-
tive intent.7 Although the Court has not yet decided whether this
68. Id. at 765.
69. Id. at 767-70.
70. See, e.g., Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), aff'd per
curiam on other grounds sub nom. East Carrol Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636
(1976); Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1973); Pitts v. Busbee, 395 F. Supp. 35
(N.D. Ga. 1975).
71. The one man, one vote doctrine describes the constitutional requirement that an elector
in one district have the same potential to control a legislative body through his vote as does
an elector in any other voting district. See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The concept applies to municipal as well as state
governments. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
72. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
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intent requirement is applicable in voting dilution cases, neither has
it identified any exception to the rule. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit
recently has held in Nevett v. Sides 3 that discriminatory intent
must be proved in voting dilution challenges based on the fifteenth
as well as the fourteenth amendment." According to the court in
Nevett, proof of dilution within the meaning of White raises an
inference of intent.7 5 Of course, this narrower construction of White
places a greater burden on plaintiffs; regardless of the existence of
an aggregate of the factors listed in White, defendants still may offer
proof to overcome the inference of intentional discrimination.76
The Fifth Circuit's holding in Nevett, thus, significantly reduced
the ability of plaintiffs to challenge successfully the constitution-
ality of voting systems that operate to dilute the voting strength of
racial minorities. Despite its constricting effect, however, Nevett
appears to be an accurate construction of constitutional law. The
Supreme Court has held that a valid charge of unconstitutional
discrimination requires evidence of intent, 7  and a claim of racial
dilution certainly is based on discrimination. The Court's holding
in Whitcomb, that a minority group has no constitutional right to
be represented in proportion to its voting potential, necessitates an
inquiry into whether the state or municipal voting system was
adopted or maintained for the discriminatory purpose of preventing
the minority group from achieving such representation. Proof of the
factors enumerated in White may establish the existence of dilution
and its discriminatory effect, but such evidence may be insufficient
to demonstrate discriminatory intent. The pertinent issue in a dilu-
tion case, therefore, is whether the voting system was adopted or
maintained "with the purpose of excluding minority input. ' '78
265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976).
73. 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978).
74. Id. at 215, 221. In support of its conclusion the Fifth Circuit cited Wright v. Rockefeller,
376 U.S. 52 (1964), a case rejecting allegations that New York's congressional apportionment
plan was a racial gerrymander in violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. The
Supreme Court relied upon Wright in both Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976),
and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977),
to support its conclusion that discriminatory intent is necessary to establish a violation of
the fourteenth amendment.
75. Id. at 222-24.
76. See id. at 224.
77. See sources cited note 72 supra.
78. 571 F.2d at 221-22.
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Voting Rights Act
Congress enacted Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 196511 to
reduce states' incentive to take subtle actions designed to promote
racial discrimination.80 The presence of two factors, as determined
by the United States Attorney General, triggers the application of
the Act: the state's maintenance of a test or device to abridge the
right to vote on the basis of race or color on November 1, 1964, 1968,
or 1972, and a determination by the Director of the Census that less
than fifty percent of eligible racial minority members either were
registered on that date or voted in the presidential election of that
year.81
Section 5 of the Act provides that the subject local government
or state may not change its electoral system as it existed on Novem-
ber 1 of the year during which the prerequisite factors were met
without first obtaining either the prior approval of the United States
Attorney General or a declaratory judgment from the District Court
for the District of Columbia.82 Actions implicating the application
of Section 5 include changing the location of a polling place,83
changing the existing voting system, 4 transforming an elective
office into an appointive office, 5 annexation,8 or legislative reappor-
tionment,"' unless such reapportionment is pursuant to a federal
court order to correct an unconstitutional electoral system.88 The
Act does not apply retroactively, ' however, and approval is un-
necessary to implement an electoral system ordered by a federal
court to correct illegal racial discrimination. 0
In practice, states or localities subject to the Act first submit
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970).
80. For a discussion of the history and constitutionality of § 5, see South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
81. See Voting Rights Act, § 4, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1970). In 1970 the Act's coverage was
extended to suspend the use of literacy and related tests nationwide. Id. §§ 1973b-1973c.
82. Id. § 1973c. Section 5 also provides for direct appeals to the Supreme Court. Id.
83. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
84. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
85. Id., rev'g Bunton v. Patterson, 281 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Miss. 1967).
86. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
87. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
88. Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971).
89. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976). Of course, the constitutionality of a system
adopted before the Act's coverage began still may be challenged. See notes 52-78 supra &
accompanying text.
90. Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971).
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proposed changes to the Attorney General and resort to the courts
only if he rejects their plan." In the event of a dispute over the
validity of a suggested change, the state or locality has the burden
of proving the validity of its proposal. 2 Unlike the inquiry in a case
alleging the unconstitutionality of a voting system, however, which
focuses on the issue of discriminatory intent, an evaluation of a
proposal's validity under the Voting Rights Act centers on the
change's effect on a racial minority's political strength. 3 Thus, even
if a change has no discriminatory purpose, it will not be approved
under Section 5 unless an analysis of the proposal demonstrates
that no discrimination would result from its implementation. 4
In Beer v. United States,95 a municipal reapportionment case, the
Supreme Court announced the basic standard for evaluating a pro-
posed change under the Voting Rights Act, declaring impermissible
any changes in apportionment that "lead to a retrogression in the
position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise
of the electoral franchise."" The Court in Beer approved a combined
at-large and single-member district plan for New Orleans, under
which the blacks, who comprised forty-five percent of the city's
population and thirty-five percent of its registered voters, could be
expected to elect "at least one and perhaps two" representatives to
the seven-member council.9 7 Although the plan did not provide an
opportunity for blacks to achieve representation commensurate
with their numbers, it was acceptable because it increased the prob-
ability that a city council member would be elected by black voters,
who had been unable to elect any candidates under the previous
apportionment. 8 In Hasidic Jews the Court reaffirmed its holding
in Beer, concluding that a change increasing the proportion of wards
91. See, e.g., United Jewish Organs., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); City of Richmond
v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975). In 1978, the City of Dallas, however, decided to ignore
the Attorney General and filed directly in the District Court for the District of Columbia.
92. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
93. See, e.g., Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
94. See, e.g., City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd,
410 U.S. 962 (1973) (proposed annexation rejected because it unintentionally caused racial
dilution).
95. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
96. Id. at 141.
97. Id. 139, 141-42. The at-large system was adopted in 1954; consequently, it could not
be rejected under the Voting Rights Act, which does not apply retroactively. Id. at 138-39.
98. Id. at 141-42.
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with black majorities satisfied the terms of the Voting Rights Act."
The non-retrogression test announced in Beer is important for
defining the usual remedial requirements of the Voting Rights Act.
Beer involved a situation in which the New Orleans' apportionment
plan prevented the black minority group from achieving representa-
tion in proportion to their numerical voting strength. By preventing
further dilution, the non-retrogression test encourages the adoption,
in successive reapportionments, of an election plan in which the
blacks' aggregate voting power more closely approximates their ac-
tual numbers. '
Occasionally, as when a municipality attempts annexation, the
proposed change's validity may be evaluated more effectively under
an alternative standard. Annexation of a predominantly white area
clearly can reduce the political power of a racial group located
within the municipality's previous limits.'0' Consequently, in 1971,
the Supreme Court held in Perkins v. Mathews'"2 that an annexa-
tion enlarging the city's number of voters constituted a change
within the meaning of the Voting Rights Act.' 3 Although the Court's
holding in Perkins requires a city engaging in annexation to protect
the voting interests of its racial minorities, it does not prohibit that
mode of municipal expansion. Nevertheless, under Beer's non-
retrogression test, virtually every annexation significantly contrib-
uting to a city's population could be rejected, regardless of the mu-
nicipality's precautionary measures, because it could decrease the
proportion of a city's voters belonging to a racial minority group.
Consequently, at least in those instances when the municipality has
proposed measures to protect its racial minority groups' voting
strength, the legality of a proposed annexation must be evaluated
under a different criterion.
The Supreme Court delineated both this alternative standard and
the type of remedial measures necessary to satisfy it in City of
Richmond v. United States. 4 In 1970, Richmond, Virginia, annexed
territory increasing its population by nineteen percent and its real
property tax base by twenty-three percent. By adding over 45,000
99. 430 U.S. at 159.
100. See 425 U.S. at 152 n.10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 388-89 (1971).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
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whites to the city's population, the annexation reduced Richmond's
total black population from fifty-two to forty-two percent., 5 After
the Court's decision in Perkins, the Richmond city government un-
successfully sought the Department of Justice's approval of the an-
nexation. Denying approval, the Department stressed that, under
Richmond's at-large electoral system, the annexation transformed
the black population from a majority to a potentially powerless
minority.' 8
To cure this potential dilution, Richmond attempted to substi-
tute a single-member district plan for its at-large electoral plan.'0 7
The proposed remedy would have enabled black voters to elect a
percentage of the city's council members equivalent to the propor-
tion of blacks in Richmond's total population. Unless the new dis-
trict lines were designed to permit the overrepresentation of black
voters, however, the change could not restore the black population's
pre-annexation numerical voting strength. Although the district
court rejected Richmond's proposed solution,' 8 the Supreme Court
reversed, stating:
We cannot accept the position that such a single-member ward
system would nevertheless have the effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote because Negroes would constitute a lesser pro-
portion of the population after annexation than before and, given
racial block voting, would have fewer seats on the city council.' 9
The Court stressed that black voters would not be underrepresented
on Richmond's city council if its members were elected pursuant to
a ward system and concluded that potentially dilutive annexations
could be approved if accompanied by the municipality's adoption
105. In 1972 the Fourth Circuit rejected a challenge by black voters who argued that the
annexation was discriminatorily motivated. Holt v. City of Richmond, 459 F.2d 1093 (4th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 931 (1972).
106. 422 U.S. at 363-64.
107. As authority for this suggestion, Richmond relied on City of Petersburg v. United
States, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 410 U.S. 962 (1973), in which the District
Court for the District of Columbia refused to approve a municipality's proposed annexation.
By increasing the white population from a minority to a majority in a city that conducted
at-large elections, the annexation impermissibly would dilute the political strength of the
black voters. Id. at 1028. Nevertheless, the court indicated that the annexation might be
acceptable if the city substituted a single-member district plan for its present electoral
system. Id. at 1031.
108. City of Richmond v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1344, 1352-53 (D.D.C. 1974).
109. 422 U.S. at 371.
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of an electoral plan that "fairly reflects the strength of the Negro
community as it exists after annexation."'" 0
The holding in Richmond is applicable to circumstances other
than those involving annexation. For example, if population shifts
reduce the proportion of a racial minority in a municipality subject
to the Voting Rights Act, the Attorney General legally could ap-
prove a reapportionment providing the minority group with repre-
sentation reflecting its reduced percentage. Otherwise, the Act
would be construed as requiring the overrepresentation of that racial
minority group in relation to the other elements in the community,
a conclusion rejected by the Court in Richmond."'
A harmonious construction of the holdings in Beer and Richmond
defines the parameters of the Voting Rights Act's restrictions. Beer's
non-retrogression test provides the basis for rejecting any proposed
change threatening to dilute a racial minority group's voting
strength. Dilution occurs when the change prevents the minority
group from attaining representation in proportion to its percentage
of the city's population. If the current electoral plan prevents minor-
ity group members from achieving representation in proportion to
their numerical voting strength, however, an impermissible dilution
will result only when the change threatens to reduce the percentage
of municipal officials that minority voters may elect under the exist-
ing system. A change that results in dilution because of a reduction
in the percentage of the city's racial minority population may be
acceptable under Richmond if the municipality implements a plan
to prevent any impermissible dilution. Of course, an overriding
principle of this analysis is that any electoral change instituted with
the intent of discriminating against a racial minority violates both
the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act."' In such situations, an
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See notes 52-78 supra & accompanying text. In Richmond the Court remanded the
case, instructing the district court to determine "whether there are now objectively verifiable,
legitimate reasons for the annexation. . . ... 422 U.S. at 375. When issuing these instructions,
the Court clearly was cognizant of the difficulties Richmond could experience in an attempt
to de-annex territory possessed for over five years. In most situations, however, the remedy
would involve injunctive relief, and the hardships of de-annexation would be irrelevant. Thus,
in the majority of cases alleging constitutional violations, courts should ascertain the lawmak-
ers' subjective motivation in proposing the electoral change; the courts should not conduct
an independent inquiry to discover the existence of objective, but unconsidered, evidence in
support of the proposed change.
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elaborate evaluation of the effects of the change, such as those con-
ducted in Richmond and Beer, is unnecessary.
ALTERNATIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
In practice, the requirements of the Voting Rights Act have
prompted the adoption of single-member district electoral systems
providing racial minority groups with opportunities for attaining
representation in proportion to their numerical voting strength,
rather than mere access to the electoral process. Moreover, as dem-
onstrated in Hasidic Jews, the Department of Justice's emphasis on
the effect of a proposed change required municipalities to abandon
almost all criteria except racial percentages in their attempts to
adopt acceptable ward plans.' '3 Although the Court sanctioned this
approach in Hasidic Jews, 1,4 other electoral plans, such as Propor-
tional Representation, combined at-large and district elections, at-
large elections with residency requirements, limited voting, and
cumulative voting," 5 may be legally acceptable and socially prefera-
ble to the single-member district system.
Proportional Representation
Proportional Representation (PR), developed by Thomas Hare in
London in 1857,111 is designed to assure that any group with a com-
mon political interest will be represented in proportion to its voting
strength with mathematical exactness."7 The principal feature of
113. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
114. See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
115. For a more detailed discussion of these electoral systems, see E. LAKEMAN, How DE-
MOCRACIE s VOTE (3d ed. 1970); J. Ross, ELECTIONS AND ELECTORS (1955).
116. See T. HARE, THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES: PARLIAMENTARY AND MUNICIPAL
(1873); Hare, Representation in Practice and Theory, 61 FRASER'S MAGAZINE 188 (Feb. 1860).
117. The system has been used in the United States with some success, notably in New
York. See note 123 infra. PR has been applauded by the English political philosopher John
Stuart Mill:
I saw in this great practical and philosophical idea, the greatest improvement
of which the system of representative government is susceptible; an improve-
ment which, in the most felicitous manner, exactly meets and cures the grand,
and what before seemed the inherent, defect of the representative system; that
of giving a numerical majority all power, instead of only a power proportional
to its numbers, and enabling the strongest party to exclude all weaker parties
from making their opinions heard in the assembly of the nation, except through
such opportunity as may be given to them by the accidentally unequal distribu-
tion of opinions in different localities. To these great evils nothing more than
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the system is the use of transferable preferential, votes.
A voter places a "1" on the ballot opposite the candidate he favors
most. He places a "2" opposite his second choice and similarly
selects according to his preferences among the remaining candi-
dates. He may decide to vote for all or only part of the candidates
running for office. Generally, the voter's ballot will count toward the
election of his highest preference who has not been elected or de-
feated already under the system's counting device.
A successful candidate must receive a fixed quota of the votes
cast. Quotas may be fixed by one of two methods, depending on
whether a fixed or variable number of seats is available. If the num-
ber of seats is variable, for example, if each candidate commanding
75,000 votes will be elected, the legislative body implementing the
system establishes a fixed numerical quota. If the number of seats
is fixed, the minimum -required quota is dependent on the number
of voters participating in the election and is calculated by using the
formula: Q = (Y/N+1) +1, in which Q is the required quota, Y is
the total number of votes cast, and N is the number of seats avail-
able.
In determining whether a candidate has achieved a sufficient
number of votes, ballots are sorted by first choices. Any candidate
receiving a total of number "1" ballots equal to or exceeding the
quota is declared elected. When a candidate receives more than the
quota, his surplus ballots are divided among the other candidates
according to the second choices indicated. A new count is con-
ducted, and any candidate accumulating a total of number "1" and
transferred ballots equal to or exceeding the quota is declared
elected. His surplus ballots, if any, are distributed to the remaining
candidates according to the second and third choices indicated.
When this first phase of the ballot counting is completed, the next
step is to declare defeated the candidate with the fewest total of
number "1" votes and any surplus votes transferred from candi-
dates already elected and to distribute his ballots to the remaining
candidates according to the next choices marked on these ballots.
If the second choice already has been elected or defeated, the ballots
very imperfect palliations bad seemed possible; but Mr. Hare's system affords
a radical cure.
J. MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 258 (1873).
The Model City Charter, prepared by the National Municipal League, provided only for
PR until 1964, when the sixth edition offered two alternative plans. MODEL CITY CHARTER 15
(6th ed. 1964).
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are distributed according to the third choice. Again, a new count is
conducted. The process of declaring defeated the lowest candidate
and transferring his ballots to the remaining candidates indicated
as the next choice on the ballots continues until the full council is
elected. Thus, either by first choice or by transfer, most ballots help
to elect a candidate.
Two systems may be used to govern the transfer of surplus ballots.
Under the first system, after a candidate receives enough number
"1" ballots to meet the quota, any subsequent number "I" ballots
for this candidate are transferred automatically to the number "2"
choice. This surplus distribution system is used in the election of
community school boards in New York City. One possible drawback
to this method is that the second choices of a particularly large
block of votes, perhaps a late reporting precinct, might affect the
election disproportionately.
Surplus number "1T votes under the second system are distrib-
uted according to a formula. The ballots of a candidate receiving a
surplus of number "1" votes are re-examined to determine the dis-
tribution of number "2" votes. The surplus ballots then are distrib-
uted proportionally according to second choices. For example, if
candidate X receives 12,000 number "1" ballots but needs only
10,000, he has a surplus of 2,000. Assuming that candidate Y was
the number "2" choice on 6,000 of candidate X's number "1" bal-
lots, candidate Y would be given one-half of candidate X's surplus,
or 1,000 ballots.
PR's Legal Sufficiency under Federal Standards
PR does not eliminate entirely the possibility of discrimination.
Any minority whose voting strength is less then the required quota
cannot elect a candidate independently. For example, assuming
that racial block-voting occurs in a nine-seat election, a racial mi-
nority commanding less than ten percent of the vote cannot elect a
representative. Thus, a legislative body can discriminate against a
racial minority by implementing a PR system in which the required
quota is larger than the racial minority group's voting strength. As
with all electoral systems, PR may be rejected as unconstitutional
if it is adopted for a discriminatory purpose. Mere discriminatory
potential, however, which is manifest in all electoral systems, is not
a disqualifying factor in most situations.
Even if PR is proposed for non-discriminatory reasons, the estab-
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lished quotas may prevent a racial minority from independently
electing a representative. This result possibly could be rejected
under Beer's non-retrogression test in a municipality subject to the
Voting Rights Act. For example, a racial minority comprising
slightly more than five and one-half percent of the total population
and concentrated within a single district in a city using a nine-seat
single-member district plan could select the representative chosen
in that district."8 If the city implemented PR but retained its nine-
member city council, however, the racial minority could not elect a
representative under the new system unless it comprised slightly
more than ten percent of the municipality's total population."9 Con-
sequently, the adoption of PR might prevent the racial minority
from electing a representative to which it was entitled before the
electoral change.
An initial analysis suggests that this result would be permissible
under Richmond, for the minority group is entitled to representa-
tion only in proportion to its numerical voting strength. Closer scru-
tiny, however, reveals that the proposed change could cause an
impermissible dilution to which the Attorney General and the
courts validly might object under Beer. In the existing single-
member district system, a group constituting approximately five
and one-half percent of the city's population is able to select a
council member from a ward containing slightly more than eleven
percent of the city's population. Rather than correcting this overre-
presentation and providing the racial minority with representation
in proportion to its actual numbers, the implementation of PR
would deprive the minority of the ability independently to select a
representative, thus rendering it politically powerless. The non-
retrogression test announced in Beer could provide a basis for reject-
ing this dilution.
118. Assuming that the wards are numerically balanced, as required by the "one person,
one vote" doctrine, a candidate from any particular district could determine the number of
votes necessary to win an election in that district by using the formula: Q = (Y/2N) + 1, in
which Q is the required number of votes, Y is the total number of votes cast city-wide, and
N is the number of single-member districts. In a city with 100,000 voters and nine single-
member districts, the candidate would need 5,556 votes, or slightly more than 5.5% of the
total votes cast, to win a district election. Consequently, a cohesive group controlling that
percentage of the voters within the ward could select that district's representative.
119. As previously noted, the minimum quota required under PR may be calculated by
using the formula: Q = (Y/N + 1) + 1. In a city with 100,000 voters and a nine-member
council, a candidate would need 10,001 votes, or slightly more than 10% of the total votes
cast, to win the election.
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Clearly, a municipality must be given some flexibility in its at-
tempt to develop an electoral system compatible with the Voting
Rights Act. Provided that a plan presents an opportunity for racial
minorities to achieve representation in proportion to their numerical
voting strength, it should not be rejected merely because the varia-
tions between the existing and proposed systems might prevent a
minority group from electing as many council members under the
new plan as under the old. Thus, under PR, a racial minority group
might consist of more members than necessary to elect two city
councilmen but less than it needs to select three candidates; the
system nevertheless should be found acceptable, although the city
either already has implemented or could adopt a ward plan permit-
ting the same group to elect three or more council members. The
single exception to this argument, as indicated previously, might
exist in a rare situation if the implementation of PR would prevent
a racial minority, previously represented, from electing any council
members. In that particular instance, the Attorney General or a
court might reject the plan as dilutive and require the retention of
a pre-existing ward plan.
Despite these possible criticisms, legal objections to PR may be
overcome easily. To prevent dilution, either the fixed number of
seats on the city council could be increased or the fixed quota could
be decreased so that any racial minority that could have elected
only one representative under the pre-existing single-member dis-
trict plan will possess the numerical voting strength to select one
candidate under PR.'20 In practice, however, the circumstances ne-
120. The maximum number of representatives required in a PR system substituted for a
ward plan may be calculated by solving the simultaneous equations:
Q = (Y/2N) + 1 (single-member district plan)
Q = (Y/X+I) + 1 (PR)
in which Q is the number of votes required to elect a candidate under either system, Y is the
total number of votes cast city-wide, N is the number of districts in the single-member district
plan, and X is the number of council seats required under PR to prevent the implementation
of that plan from resulting in dilution. In simplified form, X=2N-1. Thus, a municipality
with nine single-member districts theoretically may need to increase the size of its city council
to 17 members if it adopts PR.
Because the size of this increase is based on two assumptions that rarely will exist in
practice, however, a much smaller increase in the council's size usually will be satisfactory.
The first assumption is that the minority group constitutes only a bare majority in the district
from which it presently selects a candidate. The second assumption is that no minority voters
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cessitating these remedial measures will seldom,,if ever, exist, and
the implementation of PR generally will satisfy the requirements of
the Voting Rights Act.
PR and the Single-Member District System Compared
The principal advantage of PR over single-member districts, as
its name suggests, is that it assures that neither the majority nor
the minority will be underrepresented or overrepresented in propor-
tion to their numbers within the entire city. Under a ward system,
assuming the existence of N equally populated districts, each repre-
sentative theoretically represents 1/Nth of the total population; in
reality, however, the council member represents primarily those
who voted for him. A geographically concentrated minority control-
ling only a bare majority of a single district's votes and a (1+1)/2N
percentage of the city's total voters conceivably can control a dis-
trict election. Because this group will select a candidate who repre-
sents a percentage of the city's population equivalent to 1/N, it will
be overrepresented under a single-member district plan.
PR not only virtually eliminates the possibility of overrepresen-
tation presented by a ward plan; it also obviates the necessity for a
municipality to emphasize racial criteria in its attempt to formulate
a voting plan providing minorities with proportional representation.
The Use of PR city-wide makes districting plans unnecessary, elimi-
nating racial gerrymandering for either benign or discriminatory
purposes.'"' Moreover, because PR is an at-large plan, it would not
encourage segregation, an effect of single-member districts criti-
cized by Justice Burger in his dissent in Hasidic Jews. 2 Unlike
ward plans, PR determines a minority group's voting strength by its
reside outside of that district and that the group therefore comprises only slightly more than
5.5% of the city's total population. See note 118 supra. In a more realistic example, the
minority group in a municipality of 100,000 voters may control 6,000 votes, or six percent of
the city's total voters, in the ward from which it elects a candidate. Moreover, two or three
percent of the voters in the remainder of the city may belong to the racial minority. The
group, therefore, may comprise as much as nine percent, or 9,000 voters, of the entire city.
Nine percent of the voters is less than the ten percent required to elect a candidate under a
PR plan in a city with a nine-member city council. See note 119 supra. As a result, the fixed
quota must be reduced to 9,000 votes or the total number of council seats must be increased
to ten so that the minority group may continue to elect a candidate after the adoption of PR.
121. The use of PR in a multimember district system would provide the same benefits as
those accompanying the adoption of the plan city-wide but on a smaller scale.
122. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
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actual size, not by its degree of concentration within a particular
part of the city.' z
PR provides a minority group with representation commensurate
with its voting strength without forcing the group's members to
distort their election preferences. Under conventional at-large elec-
toral systems, minority group voters commonly engage in "bullet-
voting" or "single shot-voting," a practice by which a voter, hoping
to increase his group's prospects of electing a candidate, marks only
one choice on the ballot; additional choices might help to defeat his
first preference. In a PR election, however, second and subsequent
choices are pertinent only if the first choice has been elected or
defeated, and the presence of subsequent choices on the ballot,
therefore, has no effect on the first choice's election prospects.
In addition to eliminating incentives for segregation, the at-large
nature of PR offers several other advantages over a ward plan. Be-
cause council members are selected in city-wide elections, they tend
to emphasize legislative policies responding to the needs of the en-
tire municipality rather than those fulfilling only a special interest
group's desires.' 24 More importantly, the at-large aspect of PR pro-
vides automatic and continuous reapportionment, permitting com-
mon interest groups to attain representation in exact proportion to
their voting strengths in each election.' 25 Finally, PR reduces the
possibility of election fraud inasmuch as the number of voters is
large and the ballots are centrally counted.
123. The effectiveness of PR in providing minority representation is demonstrated by ex-
amining election results in New York City. In the 1970 PR community school board elections,
28% of the elected candidates were black or Puerto Rican. In contrast, no Puerto Ricans and
only two blacks were on the 37-member city council though the city's population was more
than 20% black and 12% Puerto Rican. In the 1973 community school board election, 38% of
those elected were black, Chinese, or Puerto Rican; these groups comprised approximately
36% of the city's total population. Today, no black or Hispanic members serve on the city's
Board of Estimates, which determines current and capital budgets and approves contracts.
A comparison of the New York City Council's composition under PR with its composition
immediately following PR's abandonment also is instructive. The 1945 PR election produced
council members from the following parties: 14 Democrats, three Republicans, two American
Labor Party members, two Liberals, and two Communists. In the 1948 election, the Demo-
cratic Party captured 24 of the 25 council seats, although the party received only 52.6% of
the votes cast.
124. Of course, proponents of single-member district plans regard the responsiveness of
elected officials toward their immediate constitutents' special interests as a desirable charac-
teristic of those systems.
125. If PR is used in conjunction with a multimember district plan, it provides automatic
reapportionment of the seats within each district.
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PR increases the probability that candidates will be elected on
the basis of merit. The requirement that each voter rank the candi-
dates in his order of preference eliminates the potential for
"bandwagon" voting; a popular person cannot carry into office weak
or unqualified candidates who happen to be in his party. When
selecting their preferences, voters in a PR system probably have
more relevant information on which to base their decisions than
they would possess in another type of election, for PR motivates the
candidates to discuss issues, not personalities. Thus, one commen-
tator has noted:
[I]nstead of trying to beat a particular person, with temptation
to belittle his ability and blacken his character, each candidate
is trying to win a group of supporters for himself out of the whole
field. He knows that he cannot defeat the leaders of the opposi-
tion. . . . His best course is to make a vigorous statement of
what he himself stands for, without gratuitous attack on anyone
else. ,
PR's transferable-vote methodology removes the need for a pri-
mary election. Candidates unable to collect the required quota of
votes will be defeated, and the ballots on which they were listed as
preferred choices will be transferred to the voters' subsequent
choices. Thus, in a single election, all office-seekers without suffi-
cient electoral support can be eliminated, but most of the voters
selecting those persons nevertheless will participate in the selection
of a successful candidate. A municipality using PR not only saves
the cost of conducting primary elections but also lessens the poten-
tial that small voting groups may control the electoral process. A
characteristic of primary elections is a weak voter participation rate,
which often enables a small clique to control the nomination pro-
cess, particularly if the opposition is divided. A city effectively could
combat this situation, however, through the implementation of PR
and, thereby, the elimination of primary elections.
Moreover, PR's transferable-vote procedure mitigates the effect of
dissension within a group, which, under another electoral system,
might prevent it from either nominating or electing a candidate.
Under PR, if the internal dispute concerns which of the candidates
is most qualified, each member has the opportunity to rank the
candidates according to his own preference on his ballot. Conse-
126. G. HALLr, JR., PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION: THE KEY TO DEMOCRACY 72-73 (1940).
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quently, although none of the office-seekers representing the group
obtains sufficient first choices to win a council seat, one or more of
them may collect an adequate number of transferred ballots to be
elected.
Despite its advantages, PR arguably has some drawbacks, and
the single-member district system retains its proponents. 2 ' For
example, the opponents of PR argue that because it promotes civic
disunity and strife by exaggerating the voting strength of splinter
groups and encouraging political decisions based on ethnic, racial,
or religious considerations, PR is inferior to an electoral system
that deemphasizes divisive prejudices. 12 A system such as an at-
large plan that prevents minority groups from attaining represen-
tation does not alleviate prejudices; rather, it aggravates minorities'
alienation. Moreover, as has been discussed previously, an electoral
plan denying representation to racial minorities is suspect legally.
No evidence exists suggesting that voting pursuant to ethnic,
racial, or religious considerations is more common under PR than
under other electoral systems..Unlike most other systems, however,
PR permits each minority group, not merely racial minorities, to
gain representation in proportion to its numerical voting strength.
Although PR facilitates the election of minority candidates, it
does not guarantee that each neighborhood will be represented on
the city council. Representation by group, however, probably is
more effective than representation by geographic area. Indeed, as
demonstrated in Hasidic Jews, a particular district's voters may
have such antagonistic interests that the neighborhood's representa-
tive could not be expected to balance their differing viewpoints. In
such circumstances, representation by group may provide the only
opportunity for minority voters in any particular neighborhood to
participate in the selection of a candidate sharing their opinions.
Nevertheless, the residence of a particular candidate retains some
relevance under PR; the electoral decisions of a large, cohesive
group of voters concentrated in a particular section of the city may
be influenced by the various candidates' places of residence.
The counting of paper ballots cast in a PR election may take
several days. For example, in the 1939 New York City election, nine
127. See, e.g., Ghetto Voting, supra note 21.
128. See, e.g., F. HERMENs, THE REPRESENTATIVE REPUBLIC (1958); F. HERMENS, DEMOCRACY
OR ANARCHY (1941).
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days were required to determine the results. This objection is not
crucial; most winning candidates do not take office until at least two
months after their election. Although the cost of counting paper
ballots used in a PR election is greater than the cost of counting
ballots cast pursuant to another type of electoral system' PR elimi-
nates the expense of a primary election. Of course, the use of voting
machines or computer cards can reduce both the time and the cost
of counting ballots in a PR election. Additionally, although in the
first election under PR in a new locality the ballot tends to be
lengthy, the ballot soon becomes relatively short in subsequent elec-
tions as potential candidates perceive that they must have substan-
tial voter support to win the election. Nor do the electors under PR
need to know or vote for all candidates. In most cases, the transfera-
ble ballot will enable a voter who marks his first seven to ten prefer-
ences to participate in the election of one of those candidates.
The major argument advanced in opposition to PR is that its
fantastically complicated system is understood by relatively few
citizens. A voter's effective participation in an election, however, is
not dependent upon his understanding of the ballot-counting pro-
cess. He need only know that the ballot should be marked in the
order of his preferences among the candidates and that his ballot
will count toward the election of his highest priority candidate not
already elected or defeated. The small percentage, 2.5 percent, of
invalid votes cast in New York City's Community School Board
elections in the spring of 1970 suggests that the vast majority of
electors easily understand the voting procedures under PR. Moreo-
ver, the number of blank ballots cast in those elections was very
small, amounting to less than .4 percent of the total ballots cast in
most districts.
An emotional opposition to PR also may exist. The system per-
mitted the election of two Communists and two American Labor
Party candidates to the New York City Council in 1945.129 Because
the two parties accounted for eighteen percent of the first-choice
vote and won 17.5 percent of the council seats, they were able to
attain representation in proportion to their numerical voting
strength. PR provides every large minority group, regardless of its
popularity, with an opportunity to achieve representation. The
rejection of an electoral system merely for the purpose of stifling the
129. See note 123 supra. See generally F. HERmENs, THE REPRESENTATIVE REPUBLIC (1958).
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political strength of an unpopular minority generally would be un-
constitutional, as has been previously demonstrated.
Overall, PR represents a meritorious alternative to the single-
member district system that generally will be permissible under the
Voting Rights Act. The at-large nature and the transferable-vote
methodology of PR make it superior to a ward plan. Although some
tenuous criticisms of the system have been identified, these argu-
ments are unpersuasive and should not form the basis for rejecting
the implementation of a PR plan.
Combined At-Large and District Elections
To provide geographical representation and to obtain the benefits
of an at-large system, some municipalities have adopted electoral
plans whereby several council members are elected at-large and the
remainder are selected by wards. 130 This system not only furnishes
representation to specialized interests concentrated within particu-
lar geographic areas but also ensures the election of some represent-
atives who will direct their priorities toward the needs of the entire
city.
Combined at-large and district election plans are subject to some
disadvantages common to at-large systems and ward plans gener-
ally. As in all single-member district systems, the combined elec-
toral plan requires that any racial minority group obtaining repre-
sentation be concentrated within one or more of the city's wards.
Thus, to safeguard a minority's ability to select a representative, a
city would need to create districts with large racial majorities. As
in Hasidic Jews, such racial gerrymandering places a harsh burden
on non-racial minorities who intentionally are deprived of an oppor-
tunity to participate effectively in the electoral process.
Even if the wards' boundaries are designed specifically for the
purpose of providing representation to racial minority groups, those
groups will be unable to control the percentage of the city council
that reflects their numerical voting strength. If racial block-voting
occurs in the municipality, the majority group always will be overre-
presented on the council, for they will elect the at-large candidates.
130. This type of electoral system was approved by the Supreme Court in Beer. See notes
95-98 supra & accompanying text. In addition, the Metopolitan Government of Nashville and
Davidson County, which contains five council members elected at-large and 35 members
representing specific districts, holds combined at-large and district elections. METROPOLITAN
Gov. oF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON COUNTY CHARTER art. 3, § 3.01 (1962).
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This characteristic of the combined at-large and district system
prevents its indiscriminate adoption by municipalities subject to
the Voting Rights Act. Under Beer's non-retrogression test, any
change causing an impermissible dilution will be rejected. Because
the combined system has a built-in dilution factor, it is an accepta-
ble replacement only for those electoral plans that have afforded
even less representation to minorities than they will receive under
the combined plan. Consequently, although the combined system
probably could replace an at-large plan, it could not be used as a
substitute for an existing single-member district electoral system.
At-Large Elections with Residency Requirements
A municipality having an at-large electoral plan with residency
requirements conducts an otherwise straightforward at-large elec-
tion in which residency requirements are imposed on the candi-
dates. '3 Each seat on the city council is associated with a specified
district, and candidates running for a particular seat must be resi-
dents of that district. Under this system, although each geographi-
cal area of the city is represented, all the council members will have
a city-wide orientation and constituency.
The primary criticism of this system is that the majority voting
group will control the final results of the election. Although a candi-
date for a particular district may be nominated by a racial minority
group, he will not win an election in which racial block-voting occurs
if the majority also has nominated a candidate from that district.
Thus, for a racial group to elect a candidate, it must be concen-
trated sufficiently within a district to enable it to select all the
nominees from that ward. 3' To achieve this result, the percentage
131. Metropolitan Dade County uses this system. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY CHARTER
art. I, § 1.04 (.1957).
132. A municipality may have little difficulty in establshing a district in which almost all
of the voters belong to a single minority group because the population of the various districts
can be unequal. See Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967). In Dusch the Supreme Court held
constitutional an at-large electoral system in which seven of the 11 council members were
required to reside in seven different districts the populations of which varied from 733 to
29,048. Id. at 117. But see Reese v. Dallas County, 505 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1974), in which the
Fifth Circuit invalidated an electoral plan for Dallas County, Alabama, providing for at-large
elections with a requirement that each of the four county commissioners reside in a different
district. The court of appeals observed that in Dusch the Supreme Court approved a system
in which the city council could not be controlled by members who represented districts
containing a minority of the total voters. In contrast, in Reese the county commissioner
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of minority voters within the district would have to be much larger
than the sixty-five percent non-white majority approved in Hasidic
Jews.
Even if the minority group could nominate all the candidates
from a particular district, it would be unable to elect that ward's
ultimate council member. The majority of voters controlling the at-
large election would determine which of the candidates nominated
by the minority group would represent the district. The inability of
an at-large election with residency requirements to provide a racial
minority group with an opportunity to select its own representatives
renders that system only a marginal improvement over a standard
at-large electoral plan. In a municipality subject to the Voting
Rights Act, its dilutive characteristics prevent it from satisfying
Beer's non-retrogression test in almost all situations except those in
which it is offered as a substitute for a standard at-large plan.
Limited Nomination and Voting
An electoral system using limited nomination and voting has a
dual purpose: encouragement of the two-party system and provision
for the election of minority candidates. By preventing a party from
nominating a sufficient number of candidates to fill all of the avail-
able seats, this system encourages two-party politics. Similarly, the
system provides each voter with fewer votes than the total number
of available seats and thereby denies the majority an opportunity
it might otherwise have in an at-large election to win election to all
of the offices.
Although a limited nomination and voting system generally pro-
vides a municipality's largest minority group with representation,
the electoral plan has several disadvantages. The system does not
ensure the existence of proportional representation, unless the ratio
of the limitation placed on nomination and voting over the total
number of elective seats available corresponds to the proportion of
the city's largest group of voters. Adherence to this ratio requires a
city to re-evaluate constantly the numerical strength of its majority
voters and to implement corresponding nomination and voting limi-
tations. Moreover, if more than two sizeable groups are present in
the municipality, the implementation of this formula guarantees
representing Selma, which contained one-half of Dallas County's population, could be out-
voted by the three county commissioners representing the rural districts. Id. at 883-85.
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proportional representation only to those voters comprising the larg-
est group. For example, in a city with a nine-member council and
voting groups A, B, and C constituting fifty-five, twenty-five, and
twenty percent of the municipal population respectively, the for-
mula requires a voting and nomination limitation of five. If group
block-voting occurs in an election, group A will win five council
seats, group B will win four seats, and group C will receive no repre-
sentation on the council. 133
As in a typical at-large election, no preferences attach to the votes
cast by electors in a limited nomination and voting system. By using
all of his votes, an elector can increase the tally of a candidate he
least favors and thereby help to defeat his favorite candidate. Con-
sequently, to maximize his opportunity for electing a representa-
tive, a voter is encouraged to vote only for his most preferred candi-
date, a practice known as "bullet voting."
Limited nomination and voting is a crude and unreliable method
for securing minority representation. Moreover, the system is com-
plicated for the elector, who must choose whether to exercise all of
the votes to which he is legally entitled. The voter must attempt to
predict the circumstances in which his voting for more than one
candidate might contribute to the defeat of his favorite candidate.
As a method for securing proportional representation, PR clearly is
superior to limited nomination and voting. PR provides representa-
tion to all minority groups and eliminates the need for recalculating
the nomination and voting limitations every few years. PR's
transferable-vote methodology, which makes bullet voting unneces-
sary, also removes the complicating factors present in a limited
voting system.
Despite the inadequacies of a limited nomination and voting sys-
tem, its adoption would be legally acceptable in many municipali-
ties subject to the Voting Rights Act. As with other electoral plans,
the principal inquiry into a proposed limited nomination and voting
system's validity focuses upon the effect of the plan's implementa-
tion. Under Beer's non-retrogression test, a system is acceptable
whenever it provides racial minorities with a greater opportunity to
achieve proportional representation than they possess under the
existing electoral plan. Thus, although the system always could
133. Under PR, group A would elect five representatives, group B would elect two, and
group C would elect two.
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replace an at-large plan, it probably would not be an acceptable
substitute for an existing system in which the third largest group
was a racial minority already able to elect at least one council mem-
ber.
Cumulative Voting
In a cumulative voting system, each elector has a number of votes
equivalent to the total number of seats available, and he may appor-
tion his votes among the candidates in any manner he chooses. 34
Thus, if nine seats are available, the voter may give all nine of his
votes to one candidate, vote once for nine different candidates, cast
six votes for one candidate and three for another, or assign his nine
votes in any other combination.
The purpose of cumulative voting is to provide representation for
minority groups. As with PR, the minimum number of votes re-
quired to elect a candidate is determined by formula: Q = (Y/N+1)
+1, in which Q is the required vote quota, Y is the total number of
votes cast, and N is the number of seats available. To be assured of
winning an election in a city with a nine-member council, a candi-
date needs one more than ten percent of the total votes cast, the
same proportion of votes required under a PR electoral plan.':3 By
calculating its voting strength, nominating the correct number of
candidates, and then successfully instructing its members to ap-
portion their votes among the office-seekers, a cohesive group could
attain proportional representation on the city's council. Moreover,
as an at-large election system, cumulative voting, like PR, poten-
tially provides proportional representation for all minority groups.
The system therefore has at least one advantage over single-member
district plans, which, in providing representation only to geographi-
cally concentrated minorities, tend to promote segregation.':'3
The adoption of a cumulative voting system by a municipality
subject to the Voting Rights Act usually would be legally permissi-
ble. In a few rare situations, however, the legislative body enacting
this electoral plan may confront some legal objections. Thus, if a
cumulative voting plan is accompanied by a manipulative reduction
134. Many corporations are required to use cumulative voting for the election of their
directors. See generally W. CAREY, CORPORATIONS (1969); Williams, Cumulative Voting, 33
HARv. Bus. REv. 108 (1955).
135. See note 119 supra & accompanying text.
136. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
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in the city council's membership intended to prevent a racial minor-
ity from electing any representatives, the system's implementation
would be unconstitutional. In addition, as with PR, 3 a cumulative
voting plan could be impermissibly dilutive under Beer's non-
retrogression test if it threatened to deprive a geographically con-
centrated racial minority group that had achieved representation
under an existing single-member district system from electing any
council members under the new plan. Of course, a municipality
always could overcome this objection to cumulative voting by in-
creasing the city council's membership so that every minority that
previously could have elected a candidate will maintain sufficient
numerical voting strength to select a representative under the new
system. 3 ' Finally, an evaluation of a change under the Voting
Rights Act focuses primarily on the proposal's actual effect on a
racial minority's voting strength;3 ' a cumulative voting plan, which
only provides racial minorities with the potential for attaining pro-
portional representation, therefore may be an unacceptable substi-
tute for an electoral system in which those groups have actually
achieved such representation. These objections to cumulative vot-
ing clearly arise infrequently; the system's capacity for providing
racial minorities with the potential for achieving proportional repre-
sentation generally would compel its approval under the Voting
Rights Act.
Despite the legality of cumulative voting, several factors under-
mine the system's socio-political attractiveness. 0 As previously dis-
cussed, such an electoral plan can provide proportional representa-
tion only when each group successfully has accomplished a number
of complicated tasks. A group that miscalculates its voting strength
may nominate either too many or too few candidates. If too many
candidates are nominated, the group's membership may divide
their votes in a manner preventing two or more of the nominees from
receiving a sufficient number of votes to ensure their election. Such
137. See notes 118-19 supra & accompanying text.
138. As previously discussed, a municipality also can use this method to overcome any
legal objections to its proposed implementation of PR. See note 120 supra & accompanying
text.
139. See notes 93-94 supra & accompanying text.
140. Illinois uses cumulative voting to elect legislators from three-seat districts to that
state's House of Representatives. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 7. For a discussion of the problems
cumulative voting has caused in Illinois, see Hyneman and Morgan, Cumulative Voting in
Illinois, 32 ILL. L. REV. 12 (1937).
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vote splitting may enable another group to elect one of its candi-
dates who otherwise would have been defeated. As a consequence
of its miscalculation, therefore, the former group will be underrepre-
sented on the council, and the latter group will have representation
in excess of its numerical voting strength.' The same result will
occur if a group nominates an insufficient number of candidates. If
the membership divides its votes among the group's nominees, it
will elect each of those candidates with surplus ballots, and the
other council seat will be won by a different group's candidate who
will receive fewer votes than the amount usually necessary to secure
his election.4 2
If each of a municipality's groups correctly calculates its voting
strength and nominates an appropriate number of candidates, the
resulting election reveals the foremost political weakness of the
cumulative voting system. In their attempts to avoid the potentially
dilutive effects resulting from the nomination of too many candi-
dates, each group will limit its nominations according to its propor-
tional voting strength. The groups capable of electing representa-
tives, therefore, will nominate a combined total of candidates equiv-
alent to the number of seats available. This practice deprives the
voters of any significant choice in the election and eliminates any
need for the candidates to discuss issues. 43
The transferable-vote methodology of PR avoids all of the inade-
quacies of a cumulative voting plan. Under PR, a political group
never has to calculate its voting strength, and it may nominate any
number of candidates without risking a loss in representation. PR
consequently encourages groups to provide their memberships with
a variety of nominees from which preferences may be listed. More-
over, because the surplus ballots of elected candidates and all the
141. See G. BLAIR, CUMULATIVE VOTING: AN EFFECTIVE ELECTORAL DEVICE IN ILLINOIS POLITICS
103-04 (1960).
142. For example, in the 1958 Illinois election, the two majority-party candidates for seats
to that state's House of Representatives from one three-seat district were elected with 47.6%
and 45.8% of the total votes cast; in contrast, the minority-party candidate was elected after
receiving only 6.4% of the total votes.
143. In the 1970 Illinois election, for example, although one state Senate candidate had no
opposition, 93 candidates for the state House of Representatives ran unopposed. In contrast
to elections for House members, however, Senate elections are not based on cumulative
voting. In an attempt to remedy this problem, the Illinois state legislature enacted a law
preventing any political party from limiting its nominations for House members in any
particular district to less than two candidates. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 8-13 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1976).
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ballots of defeated office-seekers are transferred to the electors' sub-
sequent choices, a group's representation will not be reduced merely
because one of its candidates was exceedingly popular or because
the membership split its first choices evenly between a large number
of nominees. Through the transfer process, the group ultimately will
receive proportional representation, and none of the groups will
elect a candidate receiving less than the required number of votes.
PR AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
PR clearly is the most favorable alternative to the single-member
district system. Although federal law presents few obstacles to the
implementation of PR, some state constitutional provisions may
pose a formidable barrier to the adoption of the system. The princi-
pal 6bjection to PR concerns the system's limited voting character-
istics. Under PR, each voter may list any number of preferences on
his ballot, but his vote will contribute toward the election of only
one candidate. Consequently, although several representatives will
be selected from the geographical area encompassed by the election,
each elector effectively may exercise only one vote.
Courts in Michigan and California have held that this limited
voting characteristic of PR violated state constitutional provisions
entitling each voter to vote "in all elections."'4 Broadly construing
this language, these courts determined that the right to vote in all
elections entitles an elector to cast a vote for a candidate for each
office to be filled. 4 5 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reached a
similar conclusion in a 1939 advisory opinion to the governor inter-
preting the state's constitutional provision assuring each elector the
right to vote "in the election of all civil officers.""' Under these
holdings, an elector in a municipality with an at-large electoral plan
144. See People v. Elkus, 59 Cal. App. 396, 398-99, 211 P. 34, 36-37 (1922); Wattles v.
Upjohn, 211 Mich. 514, 179 N.W. 335, 341-42 (1920).
145. See, e.g., People v. Elkus, 59 Cal. App. 396, 398-99, 211 P. 34, 36-37 (1922). See also
Weaver, Representation of Minorities in At-Large Elections in City and Village Governments
under Michigan Law, 49 J. URw. L. 146 (1971). The decision by the Michigan Supreme Court
in Wattles v. Upjohn, 211 Mich. 514, 179 N.W. 335 (1920), may have been reversed by a 1963
amendment to that state's constitution transforming an elector's right to vote "in all elec-
tions" into a privilege to vote "in any election." MICH. CONST. art. II, § 1. See Weaver, supra,
at 156.
146. See Opinion to the Governor, 62 R.I. 320, 6 A.2d 147 (1939) (advisory opinion). The
current Rhode Island constitutional provision similarly entitles each elector to "vote for all
officers to be elected." R.I. CONST. amend. art. XXXVIII, § 1.
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and a nine-member city council would be entitled to nine votes in
the city's election.
In contrast to the decisions in Michigan and California, the Su-
preme Court of Ohio concluded that its state constitutional provi-
sion permitting each elector to vote "at all elections" did not render
unconstitutional Cleveland's 1921 adoption of PR.'47 Adopting a lit-
eral construction of the constitutional language, the court reasoned
that an elector was not denied the right to vote in any election
merely because his ballot was "effective in the election of fewer than
the full number of candidates."'' The court based its decision on
the state constitutional grant of home rule powers to cities, holding
that "charter cities have all powers of local self-government."' 49
The Ohio court's decision appropriately harmonizes the home
rule powers with the general voting rights provisions contained in
most state constitutions. Chartered cities in states with constitu-
tions granting strong home rule powers should have the freedom to
adopt the most effective electoral plan for their locality. 5 ' Neverthe-
less, this issue is unresolved in other states with constitutions enti-
tling each voter to participate in all elections, '' and implementation
of PR in those jurisdictions may require either a favorable court
decision or a state constitutional amendment.
In 1937 the New York Court of Appeals determined that PR did
not violate a state constitutional provision providing each elector
with the right to vote "for all officers." '52 The primary authority for
the court's decision, however, which contradicted the advisory opin-
ion issued by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, was the long-
standing and unchallenged use of limited voting in both New York
State and City.' 53 Consequently, other states having similar consti-
tutional provisions'54 but shorter limited voting histories may be
reluctant to follow the New York decision. In those states, the adop-
tion of PR could require a state constitutional amendment.
The transferable-vote methodology of PR may subject this system
147. Reutener v. City of Cleveland, 107 Ohio St. 117, 141 N.E. 27, 32 (1923).
148. Id. at . 141 N.E. at 33.
149. Id. at 141 N.E. at 34.
150. See also Weaver, supra note 147, at 56.
151. See, e.g., ALAs. CONST. art. V, § 1; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 1; PA. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
152. Johnson v. City of New York, 274 N.Y. 411, 9 N.E.2d 30 (1937).
153. Id. at 421, 9 N.E.2d at 38.
154. See, e.g., N.J. CONsT. art. II, 3.
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to other state constitutional objections. For example, challengers
.opposed the use of PR to elect the Cambridge city council, claiming
that the system violated the state's constitution, which provided
that in "all elections of civil officers by the people of this Common-
wealth, whose election is provided for by the Constitution, the per-
son having the highest number of votes shall be deemed and de-
clared elected." '155 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court re-
jected the complaint on the ground that the state constitution did
not, as expressly required to trigger the clause, provide for the elec-
tion of the Cambridge city council's members.'56
In addition PR's transferable-vote mechanism may violate Flor-
ida's constitution, which states that "all elections by the people
shall be by direct and secret vote."'57 Because PR's transfer process
will help to elect some candidates indirectly, it could be held uncon-
stitutional. A court probably would interpret "direct" to govern only
the voting process, however, and to require merely that an elector
personally mark his ballot or operate the voting machine. Under this
interpretation, PR would be constitutional in Florida.
CONCLUSION
In Whitcomb v. Chavis,"'1 the Supreme Court recognized that
single-member district plans may not best remedy the problems
associated with multi-member districting systems:
It is not at all clear that the remedy is a single member district
system with its lines carefully drawn to ensure representation to
sizable racial, ethnic, economic, or religious groups with its own
capacity for overrepresenting and underrepresenting parties and
interests and even for permitting a minority of voters to control
the legislature and government of a State."'
Nevertheless, the trend toward the imposition of single-member
district systems with boundaries that are drawn according to racial
considerations on localities subject to the Voting Rights Act contin-
ues unabated, with virtually no consideration of the use of alterna-
tive electoral plans. As demonstrated in Hasidic Jews, these
155. MASS. CONST. amend. art. XIV.
156. Moore v. Election Comm'rs of Cambridge, 309 Mass. 3Q3, _ 35 N.E.2d 222, 231
(1941).
157. FLA. CONsT. art. VI, § 1.
158. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
159. Id. at 159-60.
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"remedial" activities have inflicted extreme socio-political hard-
ships on non-racial minority groups who intentionally may be de-
prived of their voting strength in racially gerrymandered electoral
systems.
Clearly, as this Article indicates, many alternative electoral sys-
tems are acceptable under the Voting Rights Act in different cir-
cumstances. At least one of these alternatives, Proportional Repre-
sentation (PR), provides all minority groups with representation in
proportion with their numerical voting strengths and avoids the
debilitating characteristics of ward plans. Consequently, when
given a choice between a racially gerrymandered single-member
district system furnishing racial minorities with proportional repre-
sentation and PR, law enforcement agencies and courts always
should select the latter as the most socially beneficial alternative.
The Department of Justice is partly responsible for the hardships
created by many recently implemented single-member district
plans. Although the Department's authority under the Voting
Rights Act merely enables it either to approve or reject proposed
electoral changes made by state and local governments, it often
confers informally with these jurisdictions in the development of
their proposals. The Department provides indications during these
conferences of the type of system it would approve. Unfortunately,
however, as suggested by the sixty-five percent non-white figure
promoted by the Department's officials in Hasidic Jews, this advice
often is unimaginative and, as observed by Chief Justice Burger,
unnecessarily rigid in relation to the state's obligation under the
Voting Rights Act. 6' If the Department of Justice continues to pro-
vide assistance to covered jurisdictions in their efforts to comply
with the Voting Rights Act, it should be aware of the acceptable
alternatives to the single-member district system, such as PR, and
should educate states and municipalities as to the benefits of these
electoral plans.
160. 430 U.S. at 183 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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